Info For You Lot Hannibal Barca: The Bully African Armed Services Strategist, War-General In Addition To The Builder Of Metropolis Of Barcelona
Hannibal, boy of Hamilcar Barca (247 – 183/182 BC) was a Punic Carthaginian military machine commander, to a greater extent than oftentimes than non considered i of the greatest military machine commanders inward history. His father, Hamilcar Barca, was the leading Carthaginian commander during the First Punic War, his younger brothers were Mago too Hasdrubal, too he was brother-in-law to Hasdrubal the Fair. Hannibal made the metropolis of Barcelona after his manful mortal parent "the stockade Hamilcar established, which was built upwards yesteryear his boy after his death, is what has grown to go the nifty metropolis of Barcelona today. Carthage is partly nether acquaint solar daytime Tunis."
Hannibal lived during a menstruum of nifty tension inward the Mediterranean, when the Roman Republic established its supremacy over other nifty powers such as Carthage, the Hellenistic kingdoms of Macedon, Syracuse, too the Seleucid empire. One of his most famous achievements was at the outbreak of the Second Punic War, when he marched an army, which included state of war elephants, from Iberia over the Pyrenees too the Alps into northern Italy. In his firstly few years inward Italy, he won 3 dramatic victories—Trebia, Trasimene, andCannae, inward which he distinguished himself for his powerfulness to determine his too his opponent’s strengths too weaknesses, too to play the battle to his strengths too the enemy’s weaknesses—and won over many allies of Rome. Hannibal occupied much of Italy for 15 years, but a Roman counter-invasion of North Africa forced him to homecoming to Carthage, where he was decisively defeated yesteryear Scipio Africanus at the Battle of Zama. Scipio had studied Hannibal’s tactics too brilliantly devised some of his own, too finally defeated Rome’s nemesis at Zama, having previously driven Hasdrubal, Hannibal’s brother, out of the Iberian Peninsula.
After the war, Hannibal successfully ran for the business office of suffete. He enacted political too fiscal reforms to enable the payment of the state of war indemnity imposed yesteryear Rome; however, Hannibal’s reforms were unpopular with members of the Carthaginian aristocracy too inward Rome, too he fled into voluntary exile. During this time, he lived at the Seleucid court, where he acted as military machine adviser to Antiochus III inward his state of war against Rome. After Antiochus met defeat at the Battle of Magnesia too was forced to select Rome’s terms, Hannibal fled again, making a halt inward Armenia. His flying ended inward the courtroom of Bithynia, where he achieved an outstanding naval victory against a fleet from Pergamon. He was afterwards betrayed to the Romans too committed suicide yesteryear poisoning himself.
Often regarded as i of the greatest military machine strategists inward African history, Hannibal would after live considered i of the greatest generals of antiquity. Rome, came to adopt elements of his military machine tactics inward its ain strategic arsenal. This praise has earned him a potent reputation inward the modern world, too he was regarded as a nifty strategist yesteryear men similar Napoleon Bonaparte too the Duke of Wellington.
Background too early on career
Hannibal was i of the sons of Hamilcar Barca, a Carthaginian leader. He had several sisters too 2 brothers, Hasdrubal too Mago. His brothers-in-law were Hasdrubal the Fair too the Numidian manful mortal monarch Naravas. He was soundless a kid when his sisters married, too his brothers-in-law were unopen associates during his father's struggles inward the Mercenary War too the Punic conquest of Iberia. In low-cal of Hamilcar Barca's cognomen, historians refer to Hamilcar's theatre unit of measurement as the Barcids. However, at that spot is debate as to whether the cognomen Barca (meaning "thunderbolt") was applied to Hamilcar lone or was hereditary inside his family. If the latter, too so Hannibal too his brothers also bore the call 'Barca'.
After Carthage's defeat inward the First Punic War, Hamilcar set out to improve his family's too Carthage's fortunes. With that inward heed too supported yesteryear Gades, Hamilcar began the subjugation of the tribes of the Iberian Peninsula. Carthage at the fourth dimension was inward such a poor province that its navy was unable to carry his regular army to Iberia (Hispania); instead, Hamilcar had to march it towards the Pillars of Hercules too carry it across the Strait of Gibraltar (present-day Morocco/Gibraltar).
According to Livy, Hannibal much after said that when he came upon his manful mortal parent too begged to go with him, Hamilcar agreed too demanded that he swear that as long as he lived he would never live a friend of Rome. There is fifty-fifty an concern human relationship of him at a rattling immature historic menstruum begging his manful mortal parent to select him to an overseas war. In the story, Hannibal's manful mortal parent took him upwards too brought him to a sacrificial chamber. Hamilcar held Hannibal over the burn roaring inward the sleeping room too made him swear that he would never live a friend of Rome. Other sources study that Hannibal told his father, "I swear so before long as historic menstruum volition permit...I volition exercise burn too steel to arrest the destiny of Rome." According to the tradition, Hannibal's oath took identify inward the town of Peñíscola, today part of the community of Valencia, Spain.
Hannibal's manful mortal parent went close the conquest of Hispania. When his manful mortal parent drowned inward battle, Hannibal's brother-in-law Hasdrubal succeeded to his command of the regular army with Hannibal serving as an officeholder nether him. Hasdrubal pursued a policy of consolidation of Carthage's Iberian interests, fifty-fifty signing a treaty with Rome whereby Carthage would non expand northward of the Ebro River, so long as Rome did non expand due south of it. Hasdrubal also endeavoured to consolidate Carthaginian powerfulness through diplomatic relationships with native tribes. As a part of his deals Hasdrubal arranged the wedlock betwixt Hannibal too an Iberian princess named Imilce.
Upon the assassination of Hasdrubal (221 BC), Hannibal was proclaimed commander-in-chief yesteryear the regular army too confirmed inward his appointment yesteryear the Carthaginian government. Livy, a Roman scholar, gives a depiction of the immature Carthaginian:
No sooner had he arrived...the old soldiers fancied they saw Hamilcar inward his youth given dorsum to them; the same vivid look; the same burn inward his eye, the same clitoris a fast i on of countenance too features. Never was i too the same spirit to a greater extent than skillful to encounter opposition, to obey, or to command...
After he assumed command, Hannibal spent 2 years consolidating his holdings too completing the conquest of Hispania, due south of the Ebro. In his firstly campaign, Hannibal attacked too stormed the Olcades' strongest centre, Alithia, which promptly led to their surrender, too brought Punic powerfulness unopen to the River Tagus. His next cause inward 220 was against the Vaccaei to the west, where he stormed the Vaccaen strongholds of Helmantice too Arbucala. On his homecoming home, laden with many spoils, a coalition of Castilian tribes, led yesteryear the Carpetani, attacked, too Hannibal won his firstly major battlefield success too showed off his tactical skills at the battle of the River Tagus. However, Rome, fearing the growing strength of Hannibal inward Iberia, made an alliance with the metropolis of Saguntum, which lay a considerable distance due south of the River Ebro too claimed the metropolis as its protectorate. Hannibal non only perceived this as a breach of the treaty signed with Hasdrubal, but as he was already planning an onslaught on Rome, this was his way to start the war. So he set siege to the city, which fell after viii months. Rome reacted to this apparent violation of the treaty too demanded justice from Carthage. In view of Hannibal's nifty popularity, the Carthaginian authorities did non repudiate Hannibal's actions, too the state of war he sought was declared at the halt of the year. Hannibal was at nowadays determined to carry the state of war into the pump of Italy yesteryear a rapid march through Hispania too southern Gaul.
Second Punic War inward Italy (218–203 BC)
Overland journeying to Italy
The journeying was planned originally yesteryear Hannibal's brother-in-law Hasdrubal the Fair who became a Carthaginian full general inward Iberia inward 229 BC. He would maintain this post service for some viii years until 221 BC. Soon the Romans became aware of an alliance betwixt Carthage too the Celts of the Po River valley inward Northern Italy. The latter were amassing forces to invade farther due south inward Italy, presumably with Carthaginian backing. Thus, the Romans preemptively invaded the Po part inward 225 BC. By 220 BC, the Romans had annexed the expanse as Gallia Cisalpina. Hasdrubal was assassinated about the same fourth dimension (221 BC), bringing Hannibal to the fore. It seems that, having patently dealt with the threat of a Gallo-Carthaginian invasion (and perchance knowing that the original Carthaginian commander had been killed), the Romans lulled themselves into a simulated sense of security. Thus, Hannibal took the Romans yesteryear surprise a scant 2 years after inward 218 BC yesteryear exactly reviving too adapting the original Gaulish-Carthaginian invasion excogitation of his brother-in-law.
Hannibal departed New Carthage inward belatedly bound of 218 BC. He fought his way through the northern tribes to the foothills of the Pyrenees, subduing the tribes through clever mount tactics too stubborn fighting. He left a detachment of 20,000 troops to garrison the newly conquered region. At the Pyrenees, he released 11,000 Iberian troops who showed reluctance to larn out their homeland. Hannibal reportedly entered Gaul with 40,000 pes soldiers too 12,000 horsemen.
Hannibal recognized that he soundless needed to cross the Pyrenees, the Alps, too many important rivers. Additionally, he would have got to struggle with opposition from the Gauls, whose territory he passed through. Starting inward the bound of 218 BC, he crossed the Pyrenees and, yesteryear conciliating the Gaulish chiefs along his passage, reached the River Rhône before the Romans could select whatever measures to bar his advance. Arriving at the Rhône inward September, Hannibal's regular army numbered 38,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, too 37 state of war elephants, most of which could non endure the harsh conditions.
After outmaneuvering the natives, who had tried to forestall his crossing, Hannibal evaded a Roman forcefulness marching from the Mediterranean coast yesteryear turning inland upwards the valley of the Rhône. His exact route over the Alps has been the source of scholarly dispute ever since. (Polybius, the surviving ancient concern human relationship closest inward fourth dimension to Hannibal's campaign, reports that the route was already debated.) The most influential modern theories favor either a march upwards the valley of the Drôme too a crossing of the main make to the due south of the modern highway over the Col de Montgenèvre or a march farther northward upwards the valleys of the Isère too Arc crossing the main make close the acquaint Col de Mont Cenis or the Little St Bernard Pass. Recent numismatic evidence suggests that Hannibal's regular army may have got passed inside sight of the Matterhorn.
By Livy's concern human relationship the crossing was accomplished inward the human face of huge difficulties. These Hannibal surmounted with ingenuity, such as when he used vinegar too burn to interruption through a rockfall. According to Polybius he arrived inward Italy accompanied yesteryear 20,000 pes soldiers too 4,000 horsemen, too only a few elephants. The fired rockfall lawsuit is mentioned only yesteryear Livy; Polybius is mute on the dependent area too at that spot is no evidence of carbonized stone at the only two-tier rockfall inward the Western Alps, located below the Col de la Traversette (Mahaney, 2008). If Polybius is right inward his figure for the number of troops he commanded after the crossing of the Rhône, this would advise that he had lost almost one-half of his force. Historians similar Serge Lancell have got questioned the reliability of the figures for the number of troops he had when he left Hispania. From the start, he seems to have got calculated that he would have got to operate without assistance from Hispania.
Hannibal’s vision of military machine affairs, derived partly from the pedagogy of his Greek tutors too experience gained amongst his father, stretched over most of the Hellenistic World of his time. Indeed, the breadth of his vision gave rising to his grand strategy of conquering Rome yesteryear opening a northern front end too subduing allied city-states on the peninsula rather than yesteryear attacking Rome directly. Historical events, which led to the defeat of Carthage during the First Punic War when his manful mortal parent commanded the Carthaginian Army, led Hannibal to excogitation the invasion of Italy yesteryear ground across the Alps.
The chore was daunting to say the least. It involved the mobilization of betwixt 60,000 too 100,000 troops (see Proctor, 1971) too the grooming of a war-elephant corps, all of which had to live provisioned along the way. The alpine invasion of Italy was a military machine functioning that would milk tremble the Mediterranean World of 218 BC with repercussions for to a greater extent than than 2 decades. It was a world state of war inward the sense that it involved close three-quarters of the population of the entire Punic-Greco-Roman world too few people living inward the Mediterranean were able to escape it. Virtually every theatre unit of measurement inward Rome lost a fellow member or members inward the swath of devastation brought downward on them yesteryear Hannibal too his Carthaginian armies.
Battle of Trebia
Hannibal's perilous march brought him into the Roman territory too frustrated the attempts of the enemy to combat out the main number on unusual ground. His precipitous appearance amongst the Gauls of the Po Valley, moreover, enabled him to detach those tribes from their novel allegiance to the Romans before the latter could select steps to cheque the rebellion.
Publius Cornelius Scipio, the consul who commanded the Roman forcefulness sent to intercept Hannibal, too Scipio Africanus' father, had non expected Hannibal to brand an endeavour to cross the Alps, since the Romans were prepared to combat the state of war inward Iberia. With a little detachment soundless positioned inward Gaul, Scipio made an endeavour to intercept Hannibal. Through prompt determination too speedy movement, he succeeded inward transporting his regular army to Italy yesteryear sea, inward fourth dimension to encounter Hannibal. Hannibal's forces moved through the Po Valley too were engaged inward a large scale skirmish at Ticinus. Here, Hannibal forced the Romans, yesteryear virtue of his superior cavalry, to evacuate the land of Lombardy. While the victory was minor, it encouraged the Gauls too Ligurians to bring together the Carthaginian cause, whose troops bolstered his regular army dorsum to about 40,000 men. Scipio was severely injured, his life only saved yesteryear the bravery of his boy who rode dorsum onto the land to rescue his fallen father. Scipio retreated across the river Trebia to military camp at Placentia with his regular army mostly intact.
The other Roman consular regular army was rushed to the Po Valley. Even before word of the defeat at Ticinus had reached Rome, the Senate had ordered the Consul Sempronius Longus to convey his regular army dorsum from Sicily to encounter Scipio too human face Hannibal. Hannibal, yesteryear skillful maneuvers, was inward spot to caput him off, for he lay on the direct route betwixt Placentia too Arminum, yesteryear which Sempronius would have got to march to reinforce Scipio. He too so captured Clastidium, from which he drew large amounts of supplies for his men. But this gain was non without its loss, as Sempronius avoided Hannibal's watchfulness, slipped about his flank, too joined his colleague inward his military camp close the Trebia River close Placentia. There, inward Dec of the same year, Hannibal had an chance to exhibit his masterful military machine science at Trebia; where after wearing downward the superior Roman infantry he too so cutting it to pieces with a surprise onslaught too ambush from the flanks.
Battle of Lake Trasimene
Hannibal quartered his troops for the wintertime with the Gauls, whose back upwards for him had abated. In the Spring of 217 BC, Hannibal decided to observe a to a greater extent than reliable base of operations of operations farther south. Expecting Hannibal to advance on Rome, Gnaeus Servilius too Gaius Flaminius (the novel consuls of Rome) took their armies to block the eastern too western routes Hannibal could use.
The only alternative route to key Italy lay at the oral cavity of the Arno. This expanse was practically i huge marsh, too happened to live flood to a greater extent than than usual during this detail season. Hannibal knew that this route was total of difficulties, but it remained the surest too sure enough the quickest way to key Italy. Polybius claims Hannibal's men marched for 4 days too 3 nights, “through a ground that was nether water”, suffering terribly from fatigue too enforced desire of sleep. He crossed the Apennines (during which he lost his right oculus because of conjunctivitis) too the seemingly impassable Arno without opposition, but inward the marshy lowlands of the Arno, he lost a large part of his force.
Arriving inward Etruria inward the bound of 217 BC, Hannibal decided to lure the main Roman regular army nether Flaminius, into a pitched battle, yesteryear devastating the part Flaminius had been sent to protect. As Polybius recounts, "he [Hannibal] calculated that, if he passed the military camp too made a descent into the district beyond, Flaminius (partly for fearfulness of pop reproach too partly of personal irritation) would live unable to endure watching passively the devastation of the province but would spontaneously follow him . . . too give him opportunities for attack." At the same time, Hannibal tried to interruption the allegiance of Rome’s allies yesteryear proving that Flaminius was powerless to protect them. Despite this, Flaminius remained passively encamped at Arretium. Unable to delineate Flaminius into battle yesteryear mere devastation, Hannibal marched boldly about his opponent’s left flank too effectively cutting Flaminius off from Rome (thus executing the firstly recorded turning motion inward military machine history). Advancing through the uplands of Etruria, Hannibal provoked Flaminius into a hasty pursuit and, catching him inward a defile on the shore of Lake Trasimenus, destroyed his regular army inward the waters or on the adjoining slopes, killing Flaminius as good (see Battle of Lake Trasimene). This was the most costly ambush the Romans would ever sustain until the Battle of Carrhae against the Parthians. He had at nowadays disposed of the only land forcefulness that could cheque his advance upon Rome, but, realizing that without siege engines, he could non hope to select the capital, he preferred to exploit his victory yesteryear entering into key too southern Italy too encouraging a full general revolt against the sovereign power.
The Romans appointed Fabius Maximus as their dictator. Departing from Roman military machine traditions, Fabius adopted the strategy named after him: avoiding opened upwards battle, spell placing several Roman armies inward Hannibal’s vicinity inward lodge to spotter too bound his movements.
Having ravaged Apulia without bringing Fabius to battle, Hannibal decided to march through Samnium to Campania, i of the richest too most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping that the devastation would delineate Fabius into battle. Fabius closely followed Hannibal’s path of destruction, yet soundless refused to allow himself live drawn out of the defensive. This strategy was unpopular with many Romans, who believed it was a shape of cowardice.
Hannibal decided that it would live unwise to wintertime inward the already devastated lowlands of Campania, but Fabius had ensured that all the passes out of Campania were blocked. To avoid this, Hannibal deceived the Romans into thinking that the Carthaginian regular army was going to escape through the woods. As the Romans moved off towards the woods, Hannibal's regular army occupied the pass, too his regular army made their way through the give unopposed. Fabius was inside nail distance but inward this illustration his caution worked against him. Smelling a stratagem (rightly), he stayed put. For the winter, Hannibal found comfortable quarters inward the Apulian plain. What Hannibal achieved inward extricating his regular army was, as Adrian Goldsworthy puts it, "a classic of ancient generalship, finding its way into nearly every historical narrative of the state of war too beingness used yesteryear after military machine manuals". This was a severe blow to Fabius' prestige too before long after this his menstruum of dictatorial powerfulness ended.
Battle of Cannae
In the bound of 216 BC, Hannibal took the first too seized the large render depot at Cannae inward the Apulian plain. By capturing Cannae, Hannibal had placed himself betwixt the Romans too their crucial sources of supply. Once the Roman Senate resumed their consular elections inward 216 BC, they appointed Gaius Terentius Varro too Lucius Aemilius Paullus as consuls. In the meantime, the Romans, hoping to gain success through sheer strength too weight of numbers, raised a novel regular army of unprecedented size, estimated yesteryear some to live as large as 100,000 men, but to a greater extent than probable about 50-80,000.
The Romans too allied legions, resolving to human face upwards Hannibal, marched southward to Apulia. They eventually found Hannibal on the left banking concern of the Aufidus River, too encamped 6 miles (10 km) away. On this occasion, the 2 armies were combined into one, the consuls having to alternate their command on a daily basis. Varro, who was inward command on the firstly day, was a homo of reckless too hubristic nature, too was determined to defeat Hannibal. Hannibal capitalized on the eagerness of Varro too drew him into a trap yesteryear using an envelopment tactic, which eliminated the Roman numerical payoff yesteryear shrinking the combat area. Hannibal drew upwards his to the lowest degree reliable infantry inward a semicircle inward the middle with the wings composed of the Gallic too Numidian horse. The Roman legions forced their way through Hannibal's weak center, but the Libyan mercenaries on the wings, swung about yesteryear the movement, menaced their flanks. The onslaught of Hannibal's cavalry was irresistible, too Maharbal, Hannibal's master copy cavalry commander, who led the mobile Numidian cavalry on the right, shattered the Roman cavalry opposing them. Hannibal's Iberian too Gallic heavy cavalry, led yesteryear Hanno on the left, defeated the Roman heavy cavalry, too and so both the Carthaginian heavy cavalry too the Numidians attacked the legions from behind. As a result, the Roman regular army was hemmed inward with no way of escape.
Due to these brilliant tactics, Hannibal, with much inferior numbers, managed to environment too destroy all but a little remnant of his enemy. Depending upon the source, it is estimated that 50,000-70,000 Romans were killed or captured. Among the dead were the Roman Consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, as good as 2 consuls for the preceding year, 2 quaestors, twenty-nine out of the forty-eight military machine tribunes too an additional 80 senators (at a fourth dimension when the Roman Senate comprised no to a greater extent than than 300 men, this constituted 25%–30% of the governing body). This makes the battle i of the most catastrophic defeats inward the history of Ancient Rome, too i of the bloodiest battles inward all of human history (in terms of the number of lives lost inside a unmarried day). After Cannae, the Romans were rattling hesitant to human face upwards Hannibal inward pitched battle, preferring instead to weaken him yesteryear attrition, relying on their advantages of interior lines, supply, too manpower. As a result, Hannibal fought no to a greater extent than major battles inward Italy for the residue of the war. It is believed his refusal to convey the state of war to Rome itself was due to a lack of commitment from Carthage of men, coin too materiel — principally siege equipment. Whatever the reason, the choice prompted Maharbal to say, "Hannibal, y'all know how to gain a victory, but non how to exercise one."
As a final result of this victory, many parts of Italy joined Hannibal's cause. As Polybius notes, "How much to a greater extent than serious was the defeat of Cannae, than those that preceded it tin live seen yesteryear the demeanour of Rome’s allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, at nowadays it began to waver for the unproblematic ground that they despaired of Roman Power." During that same year, the Greek cities inward Sicily were induced to revolt against Roman political control, spell the Macedonian king, Philip V, pledged his back upwards to Hannibal – so initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome. Hannibal also secured an alliance with newly appointed Hieronymus of Syracuse. It is oftentimes argued that if Hannibal had received proper fabric reinforcements from Carthage, he mightiness have got succeeded with a direct onslaught upon Rome. Instead, he had to content himself with subduing the fortresses that soundless held out against him, too the only other notable lawsuit of 216 BC was the defection of sure Italian territories, including Capua, the minute largest metropolis of Italy, which Hannibal made his novel base. However, only a few of the Italian city-states he expected to gain as allies defected to him.
Stalemate
The state of war inward Italy settled into a strategic stalemate. The Romans utilized the attritional strategy Fabius had taught them, too which, they finally realized, were the only viable way of defeating Hannibal. Indeed, Fabius received the surname "Cunctator" ("the Delayer") because of his policy of non coming together Hannibal inward opened upwards battle but through guerilla, scorched Earth tactics. The Romans deprived Hannibal of a large-scale battle too instead, assaulted his weakening regular army with multiple smaller armies inward an endeavour to both weary him too create unrest inward his troops. For the side yesteryear side few years, Hannibal was forced to sustain a scorched Earth policy too obtain local provisions for protracted too ineffectual operations throughout southern Italy. His immediate objectives were reduced to small-scale operations centered mainly circular the cities of Campania.
As the forces detached to his lieutenants were to a greater extent than oftentimes than non unable to handgrip their own, too neither his domicile authorities nor his novel ally Philip V of Macedon helped to brand practiced his losses, his spot inward southern Italy became increasingly hard too his take chances of ultimately conquering Rome grew ever to a greater extent than remote. Hannibal soundless won a number of notable victories: completely destroying 2 Roman armies inward 212 BC, too at i point, killing 2 consuls (including the famed Marcus Claudius Marcellus) inward a battle inward 208 BC. However, inadequately supported yesteryear his Italian allies, abandoned yesteryear his authorities (either because of jealousy or simply because Carthage was overstretched), too unable to fit Rome’s resources, Hannibal slow began losing ground, never able to convey close some other grand decisive victory that could make a lasting strategic change.
Carthaginian political volition was embodied inward the ruling oligarchy. While at that spot was a Carthaginian Senate, the existent powerfulness was with the inner "Council of xxx Nobles" too the board of judges from ruling families known as the "Hundred too Four". These 2 bodies came from the wealthy, commercial families of Carthage. Two political factions operated inward Carthage: the state of war party, also known as the "Barcids" (Hannibal’s theatre unit of measurement name) too the peace political party led yesteryear Hanno II the Great. Hanno had been instrumental inward denying Hannibal’s requested reinforcements next the battle at Cannae.
Hannibal started the state of war without the total backing of Carthaginian oligarchy. His onslaught of Saguntum had presented the oligarchy with a choice of state of war with Rome or loss of prestige inward Iberia. The oligarchy, non Hannibal, controlled the strategic resources of Carthage. Hannibal constantly sought reinforcements from either Iberia or North Africa. Hannibal’s troops lost inward combat were replaced with less well-trained too motivated mercenaries from Italy or Gaul. The commercial interests of the Carthaginian oligarchy dictated the reinforcement too render of Iberia rather than Hannibal throughout the campaign.
Hannibal's retreat inward Italy
In 212 BC Hannibal captured Tarentum but he failed to obtain command of its harbour. The tide was slow turning against him, too inward favor of Rome.
The Romans too so mounted 2 sieges of Capua, which fell inward 211 BC, too completed their conquest of Syracuse too devastation of the Carthaginian regular army inward Sicily. Shortly thereafter, the Romans pacified Sicily too entered into an alliance with the Aetolian League to counter Phillip V. Philip, who attempted to exploit Rome's preoccupation inward Italy to conquer Illyria, at nowadays found himself nether onslaught from several sides at i time too was chop-chop subdued yesteryear Rome too her Greek allies. Meanwhile, Hannibal had defeated Fulvius at the battle of Herdonia inward Apulia, but lost Tarentum the next year.
In 210 BC Hannibal i time to a greater extent than proved his superiority inward tactics yesteryear inflicting a severe defeat at Herdonia (modern Ordona) inward Apulia upon a proconsular army, too inward 208 BC destroyed a Roman forcefulness engaged inward the siege of Locri Epizephyri. But with the loss of Tarentum inward 209 BC too the gradual reconquest yesteryear the Romans of Samnium too Lucania, his handgrip on due south Italy was almost lost. In 207 BC he succeeded inward making his way i time to a greater extent than into Apulia, where he waited to concert measures for a combined march upon Rome with his blood brother Hasdrubal Barca. On hearing, however, of his brother's defeat too decease at the Metaurus he retired into Bruttium, where he maintained himself for the ensuing years. His brother's caput had been cutting off, carried across Italy, too tossed over the palisade of Hannibal's military camp as a mutual coldness message of the iron-clad volition of the Roman Republic. The combination of these events marked the halt to Hannibal's success inward Italy. With the failure of his blood brother Mago Barca inward Liguria (205–203 BC) too of his ain negotiations with Philip V of Macedon, the in conclusion hope of recovering his ascendancy inward Italy was lost. In 203 BC, after nearly 15 years of fighting inward Italy, too with the military machine fortunes of Carthage rapidly declining, Hannibal was recalled to Carthage to direct the defence of his native province against a Roman invasion nether Scipio Africanus.
After the war, Hannibal successfully ran for the business office of suffete. He enacted political too fiscal reforms to enable the payment of the state of war indemnity imposed yesteryear Rome; however, Hannibal’s reforms were unpopular with members of the Carthaginian aristocracy too inward Rome, too he fled into voluntary exile. During this time, he lived at the Seleucid court, where he acted as military machine adviser to Antiochus III inward his state of war against Rome. After Antiochus met defeat at the Battle of Magnesia too was forced to select Rome’s terms, Hannibal fled again, making a halt inward Armenia. His flying ended inward the courtroom of Bithynia, where he achieved an outstanding naval victory against a fleet from Pergamon. He was afterwards betrayed to the Romans too committed suicide yesteryear poisoning himself.
Often regarded as i of the greatest military machine strategists inward African history, Hannibal would after live considered i of the greatest generals of antiquity. Rome, came to adopt elements of his military machine tactics inward its ain strategic arsenal. This praise has earned him a potent reputation inward the modern world, too he was regarded as a nifty strategist yesteryear men similar Napoleon Bonaparte too the Duke of Wellington.
Background too early on career
Hannibal was i of the sons of Hamilcar Barca, a Carthaginian leader. He had several sisters too 2 brothers, Hasdrubal too Mago. His brothers-in-law were Hasdrubal the Fair too the Numidian manful mortal monarch Naravas. He was soundless a kid when his sisters married, too his brothers-in-law were unopen associates during his father's struggles inward the Mercenary War too the Punic conquest of Iberia. In low-cal of Hamilcar Barca's cognomen, historians refer to Hamilcar's theatre unit of measurement as the Barcids. However, at that spot is debate as to whether the cognomen Barca (meaning "thunderbolt") was applied to Hamilcar lone or was hereditary inside his family. If the latter, too so Hannibal too his brothers also bore the call 'Barca'.
After Carthage's defeat inward the First Punic War, Hamilcar set out to improve his family's too Carthage's fortunes. With that inward heed too supported yesteryear Gades, Hamilcar began the subjugation of the tribes of the Iberian Peninsula. Carthage at the fourth dimension was inward such a poor province that its navy was unable to carry his regular army to Iberia (Hispania); instead, Hamilcar had to march it towards the Pillars of Hercules too carry it across the Strait of Gibraltar (present-day Morocco/Gibraltar).
According to Livy, Hannibal much after said that when he came upon his manful mortal parent too begged to go with him, Hamilcar agreed too demanded that he swear that as long as he lived he would never live a friend of Rome. There is fifty-fifty an concern human relationship of him at a rattling immature historic menstruum begging his manful mortal parent to select him to an overseas war. In the story, Hannibal's manful mortal parent took him upwards too brought him to a sacrificial chamber. Hamilcar held Hannibal over the burn roaring inward the sleeping room too made him swear that he would never live a friend of Rome. Other sources study that Hannibal told his father, "I swear so before long as historic menstruum volition permit...I volition exercise burn too steel to arrest the destiny of Rome." According to the tradition, Hannibal's oath took identify inward the town of Peñíscola, today part of the community of Valencia, Spain.
Hannibal's manful mortal parent went close the conquest of Hispania. When his manful mortal parent drowned inward battle, Hannibal's brother-in-law Hasdrubal succeeded to his command of the regular army with Hannibal serving as an officeholder nether him. Hasdrubal pursued a policy of consolidation of Carthage's Iberian interests, fifty-fifty signing a treaty with Rome whereby Carthage would non expand northward of the Ebro River, so long as Rome did non expand due south of it. Hasdrubal also endeavoured to consolidate Carthaginian powerfulness through diplomatic relationships with native tribes. As a part of his deals Hasdrubal arranged the wedlock betwixt Hannibal too an Iberian princess named Imilce.
Upon the assassination of Hasdrubal (221 BC), Hannibal was proclaimed commander-in-chief yesteryear the regular army too confirmed inward his appointment yesteryear the Carthaginian government. Livy, a Roman scholar, gives a depiction of the immature Carthaginian:
No sooner had he arrived...the old soldiers fancied they saw Hamilcar inward his youth given dorsum to them; the same vivid look; the same burn inward his eye, the same clitoris a fast i on of countenance too features. Never was i too the same spirit to a greater extent than skillful to encounter opposition, to obey, or to command...
After he assumed command, Hannibal spent 2 years consolidating his holdings too completing the conquest of Hispania, due south of the Ebro. In his firstly campaign, Hannibal attacked too stormed the Olcades' strongest centre, Alithia, which promptly led to their surrender, too brought Punic powerfulness unopen to the River Tagus. His next cause inward 220 was against the Vaccaei to the west, where he stormed the Vaccaen strongholds of Helmantice too Arbucala. On his homecoming home, laden with many spoils, a coalition of Castilian tribes, led yesteryear the Carpetani, attacked, too Hannibal won his firstly major battlefield success too showed off his tactical skills at the battle of the River Tagus. However, Rome, fearing the growing strength of Hannibal inward Iberia, made an alliance with the metropolis of Saguntum, which lay a considerable distance due south of the River Ebro too claimed the metropolis as its protectorate. Hannibal non only perceived this as a breach of the treaty signed with Hasdrubal, but as he was already planning an onslaught on Rome, this was his way to start the war. So he set siege to the city, which fell after viii months. Rome reacted to this apparent violation of the treaty too demanded justice from Carthage. In view of Hannibal's nifty popularity, the Carthaginian authorities did non repudiate Hannibal's actions, too the state of war he sought was declared at the halt of the year. Hannibal was at nowadays determined to carry the state of war into the pump of Italy yesteryear a rapid march through Hispania too southern Gaul.
Second Punic War inward Italy (218–203 BC)
Overland journeying to Italy
The journeying was planned originally yesteryear Hannibal's brother-in-law Hasdrubal the Fair who became a Carthaginian full general inward Iberia inward 229 BC. He would maintain this post service for some viii years until 221 BC. Soon the Romans became aware of an alliance betwixt Carthage too the Celts of the Po River valley inward Northern Italy. The latter were amassing forces to invade farther due south inward Italy, presumably with Carthaginian backing. Thus, the Romans preemptively invaded the Po part inward 225 BC. By 220 BC, the Romans had annexed the expanse as Gallia Cisalpina. Hasdrubal was assassinated about the same fourth dimension (221 BC), bringing Hannibal to the fore. It seems that, having patently dealt with the threat of a Gallo-Carthaginian invasion (and perchance knowing that the original Carthaginian commander had been killed), the Romans lulled themselves into a simulated sense of security. Thus, Hannibal took the Romans yesteryear surprise a scant 2 years after inward 218 BC yesteryear exactly reviving too adapting the original Gaulish-Carthaginian invasion excogitation of his brother-in-law.
Hannibal departed New Carthage inward belatedly bound of 218 BC. He fought his way through the northern tribes to the foothills of the Pyrenees, subduing the tribes through clever mount tactics too stubborn fighting. He left a detachment of 20,000 troops to garrison the newly conquered region. At the Pyrenees, he released 11,000 Iberian troops who showed reluctance to larn out their homeland. Hannibal reportedly entered Gaul with 40,000 pes soldiers too 12,000 horsemen.
Hannibal recognized that he soundless needed to cross the Pyrenees, the Alps, too many important rivers. Additionally, he would have got to struggle with opposition from the Gauls, whose territory he passed through. Starting inward the bound of 218 BC, he crossed the Pyrenees and, yesteryear conciliating the Gaulish chiefs along his passage, reached the River Rhône before the Romans could select whatever measures to bar his advance. Arriving at the Rhône inward September, Hannibal's regular army numbered 38,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, too 37 state of war elephants, most of which could non endure the harsh conditions.
After outmaneuvering the natives, who had tried to forestall his crossing, Hannibal evaded a Roman forcefulness marching from the Mediterranean coast yesteryear turning inland upwards the valley of the Rhône. His exact route over the Alps has been the source of scholarly dispute ever since. (Polybius, the surviving ancient concern human relationship closest inward fourth dimension to Hannibal's campaign, reports that the route was already debated.) The most influential modern theories favor either a march upwards the valley of the Drôme too a crossing of the main make to the due south of the modern highway over the Col de Montgenèvre or a march farther northward upwards the valleys of the Isère too Arc crossing the main make close the acquaint Col de Mont Cenis or the Little St Bernard Pass. Recent numismatic evidence suggests that Hannibal's regular army may have got passed inside sight of the Matterhorn.
By Livy's concern human relationship the crossing was accomplished inward the human face of huge difficulties. These Hannibal surmounted with ingenuity, such as when he used vinegar too burn to interruption through a rockfall. According to Polybius he arrived inward Italy accompanied yesteryear 20,000 pes soldiers too 4,000 horsemen, too only a few elephants. The fired rockfall lawsuit is mentioned only yesteryear Livy; Polybius is mute on the dependent area too at that spot is no evidence of carbonized stone at the only two-tier rockfall inward the Western Alps, located below the Col de la Traversette (Mahaney, 2008). If Polybius is right inward his figure for the number of troops he commanded after the crossing of the Rhône, this would advise that he had lost almost one-half of his force. Historians similar Serge Lancell have got questioned the reliability of the figures for the number of troops he had when he left Hispania. From the start, he seems to have got calculated that he would have got to operate without assistance from Hispania.
Hannibal’s vision of military machine affairs, derived partly from the pedagogy of his Greek tutors too experience gained amongst his father, stretched over most of the Hellenistic World of his time. Indeed, the breadth of his vision gave rising to his grand strategy of conquering Rome yesteryear opening a northern front end too subduing allied city-states on the peninsula rather than yesteryear attacking Rome directly. Historical events, which led to the defeat of Carthage during the First Punic War when his manful mortal parent commanded the Carthaginian Army, led Hannibal to excogitation the invasion of Italy yesteryear ground across the Alps.
The chore was daunting to say the least. It involved the mobilization of betwixt 60,000 too 100,000 troops (see Proctor, 1971) too the grooming of a war-elephant corps, all of which had to live provisioned along the way. The alpine invasion of Italy was a military machine functioning that would milk tremble the Mediterranean World of 218 BC with repercussions for to a greater extent than than 2 decades. It was a world state of war inward the sense that it involved close three-quarters of the population of the entire Punic-Greco-Roman world too few people living inward the Mediterranean were able to escape it. Virtually every theatre unit of measurement inward Rome lost a fellow member or members inward the swath of devastation brought downward on them yesteryear Hannibal too his Carthaginian armies.
Battle of Trebia
Hannibal's perilous march brought him into the Roman territory too frustrated the attempts of the enemy to combat out the main number on unusual ground. His precipitous appearance amongst the Gauls of the Po Valley, moreover, enabled him to detach those tribes from their novel allegiance to the Romans before the latter could select steps to cheque the rebellion.
Publius Cornelius Scipio, the consul who commanded the Roman forcefulness sent to intercept Hannibal, too Scipio Africanus' father, had non expected Hannibal to brand an endeavour to cross the Alps, since the Romans were prepared to combat the state of war inward Iberia. With a little detachment soundless positioned inward Gaul, Scipio made an endeavour to intercept Hannibal. Through prompt determination too speedy movement, he succeeded inward transporting his regular army to Italy yesteryear sea, inward fourth dimension to encounter Hannibal. Hannibal's forces moved through the Po Valley too were engaged inward a large scale skirmish at Ticinus. Here, Hannibal forced the Romans, yesteryear virtue of his superior cavalry, to evacuate the land of Lombardy. While the victory was minor, it encouraged the Gauls too Ligurians to bring together the Carthaginian cause, whose troops bolstered his regular army dorsum to about 40,000 men. Scipio was severely injured, his life only saved yesteryear the bravery of his boy who rode dorsum onto the land to rescue his fallen father. Scipio retreated across the river Trebia to military camp at Placentia with his regular army mostly intact.
The other Roman consular regular army was rushed to the Po Valley. Even before word of the defeat at Ticinus had reached Rome, the Senate had ordered the Consul Sempronius Longus to convey his regular army dorsum from Sicily to encounter Scipio too human face Hannibal. Hannibal, yesteryear skillful maneuvers, was inward spot to caput him off, for he lay on the direct route betwixt Placentia too Arminum, yesteryear which Sempronius would have got to march to reinforce Scipio. He too so captured Clastidium, from which he drew large amounts of supplies for his men. But this gain was non without its loss, as Sempronius avoided Hannibal's watchfulness, slipped about his flank, too joined his colleague inward his military camp close the Trebia River close Placentia. There, inward Dec of the same year, Hannibal had an chance to exhibit his masterful military machine science at Trebia; where after wearing downward the superior Roman infantry he too so cutting it to pieces with a surprise onslaught too ambush from the flanks.
Battle of Lake Trasimene
Hannibal quartered his troops for the wintertime with the Gauls, whose back upwards for him had abated. In the Spring of 217 BC, Hannibal decided to observe a to a greater extent than reliable base of operations of operations farther south. Expecting Hannibal to advance on Rome, Gnaeus Servilius too Gaius Flaminius (the novel consuls of Rome) took their armies to block the eastern too western routes Hannibal could use.
The only alternative route to key Italy lay at the oral cavity of the Arno. This expanse was practically i huge marsh, too happened to live flood to a greater extent than than usual during this detail season. Hannibal knew that this route was total of difficulties, but it remained the surest too sure enough the quickest way to key Italy. Polybius claims Hannibal's men marched for 4 days too 3 nights, “through a ground that was nether water”, suffering terribly from fatigue too enforced desire of sleep. He crossed the Apennines (during which he lost his right oculus because of conjunctivitis) too the seemingly impassable Arno without opposition, but inward the marshy lowlands of the Arno, he lost a large part of his force.
Arriving inward Etruria inward the bound of 217 BC, Hannibal decided to lure the main Roman regular army nether Flaminius, into a pitched battle, yesteryear devastating the part Flaminius had been sent to protect. As Polybius recounts, "he [Hannibal] calculated that, if he passed the military camp too made a descent into the district beyond, Flaminius (partly for fearfulness of pop reproach too partly of personal irritation) would live unable to endure watching passively the devastation of the province but would spontaneously follow him . . . too give him opportunities for attack." At the same time, Hannibal tried to interruption the allegiance of Rome’s allies yesteryear proving that Flaminius was powerless to protect them. Despite this, Flaminius remained passively encamped at Arretium. Unable to delineate Flaminius into battle yesteryear mere devastation, Hannibal marched boldly about his opponent’s left flank too effectively cutting Flaminius off from Rome (thus executing the firstly recorded turning motion inward military machine history). Advancing through the uplands of Etruria, Hannibal provoked Flaminius into a hasty pursuit and, catching him inward a defile on the shore of Lake Trasimenus, destroyed his regular army inward the waters or on the adjoining slopes, killing Flaminius as good (see Battle of Lake Trasimene). This was the most costly ambush the Romans would ever sustain until the Battle of Carrhae against the Parthians. He had at nowadays disposed of the only land forcefulness that could cheque his advance upon Rome, but, realizing that without siege engines, he could non hope to select the capital, he preferred to exploit his victory yesteryear entering into key too southern Italy too encouraging a full general revolt against the sovereign power.
The Romans appointed Fabius Maximus as their dictator. Departing from Roman military machine traditions, Fabius adopted the strategy named after him: avoiding opened upwards battle, spell placing several Roman armies inward Hannibal’s vicinity inward lodge to spotter too bound his movements.
Having ravaged Apulia without bringing Fabius to battle, Hannibal decided to march through Samnium to Campania, i of the richest too most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping that the devastation would delineate Fabius into battle. Fabius closely followed Hannibal’s path of destruction, yet soundless refused to allow himself live drawn out of the defensive. This strategy was unpopular with many Romans, who believed it was a shape of cowardice.
Hannibal decided that it would live unwise to wintertime inward the already devastated lowlands of Campania, but Fabius had ensured that all the passes out of Campania were blocked. To avoid this, Hannibal deceived the Romans into thinking that the Carthaginian regular army was going to escape through the woods. As the Romans moved off towards the woods, Hannibal's regular army occupied the pass, too his regular army made their way through the give unopposed. Fabius was inside nail distance but inward this illustration his caution worked against him. Smelling a stratagem (rightly), he stayed put. For the winter, Hannibal found comfortable quarters inward the Apulian plain. What Hannibal achieved inward extricating his regular army was, as Adrian Goldsworthy puts it, "a classic of ancient generalship, finding its way into nearly every historical narrative of the state of war too beingness used yesteryear after military machine manuals". This was a severe blow to Fabius' prestige too before long after this his menstruum of dictatorial powerfulness ended.
Battle of Cannae
In the bound of 216 BC, Hannibal took the first too seized the large render depot at Cannae inward the Apulian plain. By capturing Cannae, Hannibal had placed himself betwixt the Romans too their crucial sources of supply. Once the Roman Senate resumed their consular elections inward 216 BC, they appointed Gaius Terentius Varro too Lucius Aemilius Paullus as consuls. In the meantime, the Romans, hoping to gain success through sheer strength too weight of numbers, raised a novel regular army of unprecedented size, estimated yesteryear some to live as large as 100,000 men, but to a greater extent than probable about 50-80,000.
The Romans too allied legions, resolving to human face upwards Hannibal, marched southward to Apulia. They eventually found Hannibal on the left banking concern of the Aufidus River, too encamped 6 miles (10 km) away. On this occasion, the 2 armies were combined into one, the consuls having to alternate their command on a daily basis. Varro, who was inward command on the firstly day, was a homo of reckless too hubristic nature, too was determined to defeat Hannibal. Hannibal capitalized on the eagerness of Varro too drew him into a trap yesteryear using an envelopment tactic, which eliminated the Roman numerical payoff yesteryear shrinking the combat area. Hannibal drew upwards his to the lowest degree reliable infantry inward a semicircle inward the middle with the wings composed of the Gallic too Numidian horse. The Roman legions forced their way through Hannibal's weak center, but the Libyan mercenaries on the wings, swung about yesteryear the movement, menaced their flanks. The onslaught of Hannibal's cavalry was irresistible, too Maharbal, Hannibal's master copy cavalry commander, who led the mobile Numidian cavalry on the right, shattered the Roman cavalry opposing them. Hannibal's Iberian too Gallic heavy cavalry, led yesteryear Hanno on the left, defeated the Roman heavy cavalry, too and so both the Carthaginian heavy cavalry too the Numidians attacked the legions from behind. As a result, the Roman regular army was hemmed inward with no way of escape.
Due to these brilliant tactics, Hannibal, with much inferior numbers, managed to environment too destroy all but a little remnant of his enemy. Depending upon the source, it is estimated that 50,000-70,000 Romans were killed or captured. Among the dead were the Roman Consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, as good as 2 consuls for the preceding year, 2 quaestors, twenty-nine out of the forty-eight military machine tribunes too an additional 80 senators (at a fourth dimension when the Roman Senate comprised no to a greater extent than than 300 men, this constituted 25%–30% of the governing body). This makes the battle i of the most catastrophic defeats inward the history of Ancient Rome, too i of the bloodiest battles inward all of human history (in terms of the number of lives lost inside a unmarried day). After Cannae, the Romans were rattling hesitant to human face upwards Hannibal inward pitched battle, preferring instead to weaken him yesteryear attrition, relying on their advantages of interior lines, supply, too manpower. As a result, Hannibal fought no to a greater extent than major battles inward Italy for the residue of the war. It is believed his refusal to convey the state of war to Rome itself was due to a lack of commitment from Carthage of men, coin too materiel — principally siege equipment. Whatever the reason, the choice prompted Maharbal to say, "Hannibal, y'all know how to gain a victory, but non how to exercise one."
As a final result of this victory, many parts of Italy joined Hannibal's cause. As Polybius notes, "How much to a greater extent than serious was the defeat of Cannae, than those that preceded it tin live seen yesteryear the demeanour of Rome’s allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, at nowadays it began to waver for the unproblematic ground that they despaired of Roman Power." During that same year, the Greek cities inward Sicily were induced to revolt against Roman political control, spell the Macedonian king, Philip V, pledged his back upwards to Hannibal – so initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome. Hannibal also secured an alliance with newly appointed Hieronymus of Syracuse. It is oftentimes argued that if Hannibal had received proper fabric reinforcements from Carthage, he mightiness have got succeeded with a direct onslaught upon Rome. Instead, he had to content himself with subduing the fortresses that soundless held out against him, too the only other notable lawsuit of 216 BC was the defection of sure Italian territories, including Capua, the minute largest metropolis of Italy, which Hannibal made his novel base. However, only a few of the Italian city-states he expected to gain as allies defected to him.
Stalemate
The state of war inward Italy settled into a strategic stalemate. The Romans utilized the attritional strategy Fabius had taught them, too which, they finally realized, were the only viable way of defeating Hannibal. Indeed, Fabius received the surname "Cunctator" ("the Delayer") because of his policy of non coming together Hannibal inward opened upwards battle but through guerilla, scorched Earth tactics. The Romans deprived Hannibal of a large-scale battle too instead, assaulted his weakening regular army with multiple smaller armies inward an endeavour to both weary him too create unrest inward his troops. For the side yesteryear side few years, Hannibal was forced to sustain a scorched Earth policy too obtain local provisions for protracted too ineffectual operations throughout southern Italy. His immediate objectives were reduced to small-scale operations centered mainly circular the cities of Campania.
As the forces detached to his lieutenants were to a greater extent than oftentimes than non unable to handgrip their own, too neither his domicile authorities nor his novel ally Philip V of Macedon helped to brand practiced his losses, his spot inward southern Italy became increasingly hard too his take chances of ultimately conquering Rome grew ever to a greater extent than remote. Hannibal soundless won a number of notable victories: completely destroying 2 Roman armies inward 212 BC, too at i point, killing 2 consuls (including the famed Marcus Claudius Marcellus) inward a battle inward 208 BC. However, inadequately supported yesteryear his Italian allies, abandoned yesteryear his authorities (either because of jealousy or simply because Carthage was overstretched), too unable to fit Rome’s resources, Hannibal slow began losing ground, never able to convey close some other grand decisive victory that could make a lasting strategic change.
Carthaginian political volition was embodied inward the ruling oligarchy. While at that spot was a Carthaginian Senate, the existent powerfulness was with the inner "Council of xxx Nobles" too the board of judges from ruling families known as the "Hundred too Four". These 2 bodies came from the wealthy, commercial families of Carthage. Two political factions operated inward Carthage: the state of war party, also known as the "Barcids" (Hannibal’s theatre unit of measurement name) too the peace political party led yesteryear Hanno II the Great. Hanno had been instrumental inward denying Hannibal’s requested reinforcements next the battle at Cannae.
Hannibal started the state of war without the total backing of Carthaginian oligarchy. His onslaught of Saguntum had presented the oligarchy with a choice of state of war with Rome or loss of prestige inward Iberia. The oligarchy, non Hannibal, controlled the strategic resources of Carthage. Hannibal constantly sought reinforcements from either Iberia or North Africa. Hannibal’s troops lost inward combat were replaced with less well-trained too motivated mercenaries from Italy or Gaul. The commercial interests of the Carthaginian oligarchy dictated the reinforcement too render of Iberia rather than Hannibal throughout the campaign.
Hannibal's retreat inward Italy
In 212 BC Hannibal captured Tarentum but he failed to obtain command of its harbour. The tide was slow turning against him, too inward favor of Rome.
The Romans too so mounted 2 sieges of Capua, which fell inward 211 BC, too completed their conquest of Syracuse too devastation of the Carthaginian regular army inward Sicily. Shortly thereafter, the Romans pacified Sicily too entered into an alliance with the Aetolian League to counter Phillip V. Philip, who attempted to exploit Rome's preoccupation inward Italy to conquer Illyria, at nowadays found himself nether onslaught from several sides at i time too was chop-chop subdued yesteryear Rome too her Greek allies. Meanwhile, Hannibal had defeated Fulvius at the battle of Herdonia inward Apulia, but lost Tarentum the next year.
In 210 BC Hannibal i time to a greater extent than proved his superiority inward tactics yesteryear inflicting a severe defeat at Herdonia (modern Ordona) inward Apulia upon a proconsular army, too inward 208 BC destroyed a Roman forcefulness engaged inward the siege of Locri Epizephyri. But with the loss of Tarentum inward 209 BC too the gradual reconquest yesteryear the Romans of Samnium too Lucania, his handgrip on due south Italy was almost lost. In 207 BC he succeeded inward making his way i time to a greater extent than into Apulia, where he waited to concert measures for a combined march upon Rome with his blood brother Hasdrubal Barca. On hearing, however, of his brother's defeat too decease at the Metaurus he retired into Bruttium, where he maintained himself for the ensuing years. His brother's caput had been cutting off, carried across Italy, too tossed over the palisade of Hannibal's military camp as a mutual coldness message of the iron-clad volition of the Roman Republic. The combination of these events marked the halt to Hannibal's success inward Italy. With the failure of his blood brother Mago Barca inward Liguria (205–203 BC) too of his ain negotiations with Philip V of Macedon, the in conclusion hope of recovering his ascendancy inward Italy was lost. In 203 BC, after nearly 15 years of fighting inward Italy, too with the military machine fortunes of Carthage rapidly declining, Hannibal was recalled to Carthage to direct the defence of his native province against a Roman invasion nether Scipio Africanus.
Conclusion of Second Punic War (203–201 BC)
Return to Carthage[
In 203 BC, Hannibal was recalled from Italy yesteryear the state of war political party inward Carthage. After leaving a tape of his expedition engraved inward Punic too Greek upon bronze tablets inward the temple of Juno at Crotona, he sailed dorsum to Africa. His arrival straight off restored the predominance of the state of war party, which placed him inward command of a combined forcefulness of African levies too his mercenaries from Italy. In 202 BC, Hannibal met Scipio inward a fruitless peace conference. Despite mutual admiration, negotiations floundered due to Roman allegations of "Punic Faith," referring to the breach of protocols that ended the First Punic War yesteryear the Carthaginian onslaught on Saguntum, too a Carthaginan onslaught on a stranded Roman fleet. Scipio too Carthage had worked out a peace plan, which was approved yesteryear Rome. The terms of the treaty were quite modest, but the state of war had been long for the Romans. Carthage could hold its African territory but would lose its overseas empire, a fait accompli. Masinissa (Numidia) was to live independent. Also, Carthage was to bring down its fleet too pay a state of war indemnity. But Carthage too so made a terrible blunder. Its long-suffering citizens had captured a stranded Roman fleet inward the Gulf of Tunis too stripped it of supplies, an activity that aggravated the faltering negotiations. Meanwhile Hannibal, recalled from Italy yesteryear the Carthaginian Senate, had returned with his army. Fortified yesteryear both Hannibal too the supplies, the Carthaginians rebuffed the treaty too Roman protests. The decisive battle at Zama before long followed; the defeat removed Hannibal's air of invincibility.
Battle of Zama
Unlike most battles of the Second Punic War, at Zama, the Romans were superior inward cavalry too the Carthaginians had the border inward infantry. This Roman cavalry superiority was due to the betrayal of Masinissa, who had before assisted Carthage inward Iberia, but changed sides inward 206 BC with the hope of ground too due to his personal conflicts with Syphax, a Carthaginian ally. Although the aging Hannibal was suffering from mental exhaustion too deteriorating wellness after years of campaigning inward Italy, the Carthaginians soundless had the payoff inward numbers too were boosted yesteryear the presence of 80 state of war elephants.
The Roman cavalry won an early on victory yesteryear swiftly routing the Carthaginian horse, too touchstone Roman tactics for limiting the effectiveness of the Carthaginian state of war elephants were successful, including playing trumpets to frighten the elephants into running into the Carthaginian lines. Some historians say that the elephants routed the Carthaginian cavalry too non the Romans, whilst others advise that it was genuinely a tactical retreat planned yesteryear Hannibal. Whatever the truth, the battle remained closely fought. At i point, it seemed that Hannibal was on the verge of victory, but Scipio was able to rally his men, too his cavalry, having routed the Carthaginian horse, attacked Hannibal's rear. This two-pronged onslaught caused the Carthaginian formation to collapse.
With their foremost full general defeated, the Carthaginians had no choice but to surrender. Carthage lost to a greater extent than or less 20,000 troops with an additional 15,000 wounded. In contrast, the Romans suffered only 1,500 casualties. The in conclusion major battle of the Second Punic War resulted inward a loss of abide by for Hannibal yesteryear his boyfriend Carthaginians. The weather of defeat were such that Carthage could no longer battle for Mediterranean supremacy.
Later career
Peacetime Carthage (200–196 BC)
Hannibal was soundless only 43 too before long showed that he could live a statesman as good as a soldier. Following the conclusion of a peace that left Carthage stripped of its formerly mighty empire, Hannibal prepared to select a dorsum spot for a time. However, the blatant corruption of the oligarchy gave Hannibal a take chances to re-emerge too he was elected as suffete or master copy magistrate. The business office had go rather insignificant, but Hannibal restored its powerfulness too authority. The oligarchy, ever jealous of him, had fifty-fifty charged him with having betrayed the interests of his province spell inward Italy, for neglecting to select Rome when he mightiness have got done so. So effectively did Hannibal reform abuses that the heavy tribute imposed yesteryear Rome could live paid yesteryear installments without additional too extraordinary taxation. He also reformed the Hundred too Four, stipulating that its membership live chosen yesteryear direct election rather than co-option. He also used citizen back upwards to modify the term of business office inward the Hundred too Four from life to a year, with a term bound of 2 years.
Exile (195–183/181 BC)
Seven years after the victory of Zama, the Romans, alarmed yesteryear Carthage's renewed prosperity, demanded Hannibal's surrender. Hannibal thereupon went into voluntary exile. He journeyed to Tyre, the woman parent metropolis of Carthage, too and so to Ephesus, where he was honorably received yesteryear Antiochus III of Syria, who was preparing for state of war with Rome. Hannibal before long saw that the king's regular army was no fit for the Romans. He advised equipping a fleet too landing a torso of troops inward the due south of Italy, offering to select command himself. But he could non brand much impression on Antiochus, who listened to his courtiers too would non entrust Hannibal with whatever of import office.[citation needed] According to Cicero, spell at the courtroom of Antiochus, Hannibal attended a lecture yesteryear Phormio, a philosopher, that ranged through many topics. When Phormio finished a discourse on the duties of a general, Hannibal was asked his opinion. He replied, "I have got seen during my life many old fools; but this i beats them all." Another story according to Aulus Gellius is that when Antiochus III showed off the gigantic too elaborately equipped regular army he had created to invade Hellenic Republic to Hannibal, he asked him if they would live plenty for the Roman Republic, to which Hannibal replied, "I think all this volition live enough, yes, quite enough, for the Romans, fifty-fifty though they are most avaricious." In 191 BC, the Romans nether Manius Acilius Glabrio routed Antiochus at Thermopylae too obliged him to withdraw to Asia. The Romans followed upwards their success yesteryear attacking Antiochus inward Anatolia, too the Seleucids were decisively defeated at Magnesia advert Sipylum inward 190 BC yesteryear Scipio Asiaticus.
In 190 BC, he was placed inward command of a Seleucid fleet, but was defeated inward a battle off the Eurymedon River. According to Strabo too Plutarch, Hannibal also received hospitality at the Armenian courtroom of Artaxias I. The authors add together an apocryphal story of how Hannibal planned too supervised the edifice of the novel regal upper-case missive of the alphabet Artaxata. When Antiochus seemed prepared to give upwards him to the Romans, Hannibal fled to Crete, but he before long went dorsum to Asia Minor too sought refuge with Prusias I of Bithynia, who was engaged inward warfare with Rome's ally, King Eumenes II of Pergamon. Hannibal went on to serve Prusias inward this war. During i of the naval victories he gained over Eumenes, Hannibal had large pots filled with venomous snakes thrown onto Eumenes' ships. Hannibal also went on to defeat Eumenes inward 2 other battles on ground until the Romans interfered too threatened Bithynia into giving upwards Hannibal.[50] Hannibal also visited Tyre, the domicile of his forefathers. However the Romans were determined to hunt him down, too they insisted on his surrender.
Death (183/181 BC)
Prusias agreed to give him up, but Hannibal was determined non to autumn into his enemies' hands. At Libyssa on the eastern shore of the Sea of Marmara, he took poison, which, it was said, he had long carried close with him inward a ring. Before dying, he left behind a missive of the alphabet declaring, "Let us salvage the Romans from the anxiety they have got so long experienced, since they think it tries their patience likewise much to hold off for an old man's death."
The precise twelvemonth of Hannibal's decease is unknown. In his Annales, Titus Pomponius Atticus reports it occurred inward 183 BC, too Livy implies the same. Polybius, who wrote nearest the event, gives 182 BC. Sulpicius Blitho records it nether 181 BC.
Legacy to the ancient world
It was written[attribution needed] that Hannibal taught the Romans the pregnant of fear. It has been said[by whom?] that for generations, Roman housekeepers would tell their children brutal tales of Hannibal when they misbehaved. In fact, Hannibal became such a figure of terror that whenever disaster struck, the Roman Senators would exclaim "Hannibal advert portas" ("Hannibal is at the gates!") to limited their fearfulness or anxiety. This famous Latin phrase became a mutual facial expression that is oftentimes soundless used[by whom?] when a customer arrives through the door or when i is faced with calamity.
The plant of Roman writers such as Livy, Frontinus, too Juvenal exhibit a grudging admiration for Hannibal. The Romans fifty-fifty built statues of the Carthaginian inward the rattling streets of Rome to advertise their defeat of such a worthy adversary. It is plausible to advise that Hannibal engendered the greatest fearfulness Rome had towards an enemy. Nevertheless, they grimly refused to acknowledge the possibility of defeat too rejected all overtures for peace; they fifty-fifty refused to select the ransom of prisoners after Cannae.
During the state of war at that spot are no reports of revolutions amongst the Roman citizens, no factions with the Senate desiring peace, no pro-Carthaginian Roman turncoats, no coups. Indeed, throughout the state of war Roman aristocrats ferociously competed with each other for positions of command to combat against Rome's most unsafe enemy. Hannibal's military machine genius was non plenty to genuinely disturb the Roman political procedure too the collective political too military machine capacity of the Roman people. As Lazenby states,
"It says volumes, too, for their political maturity too abide by for constitutional forms that the complicated mechanism of authorities continued to part fifty-fifty amidst disaster—there are few states inward the ancient world inward which a full general who had lost a battle similar Cannae would have got dared to remain, allow lone would have got continued to live treated respectfully as caput of state."
According to the historian Livy, the Romans feared Hannibal's military machine genius, too during Hannibal's march against Rome inward 211 BC "a messenger who had travelled from Fregellae for a solar daytime too a nighttime without stopping created nifty warning inward Rome, too the excitement was increased yesteryear people running close the City with wildly exaggerated accounts of the word he had brought. The wailing outcry of the matrons was heard everywhere, non only inward individual houses but fifty-fifty inward the temples. Here they knelt too swept the temple-floors with their dishevelled pilus too lifted upwards their hands to sky inward piteous entreaty to the gods that they would deliver the City of Rome out of the hands of the enemy too preserve its mothers too children from injury too outrage." In the Senate the word was "received with varying feelings as men's temperaments differed," so it was decided to hold Capua nether siege, but to send 15,000 infantry too 1,000 cavalry as reinforcements to Rome.
According to Livy, the ground occupied yesteryear Hannibal's regular army exterior Rome inward 211 BC was sold at the rattling fourth dimension of its work too for the same price. This may non live truthful but as Lazenby states, "could good be, exemplifying as it does non only the supreme confidence felt yesteryear the Romans inward ultimate victory, but also the way inward which something similar normal life continued. After Cannae the Romans showed a considerable steadfastness inward adversity. An undeniable proof of Rome's confidence is demonstrated yesteryear the fact that after the Cannae disaster she was left virtually defenseless, but the Senate soundless chose non to withdraw a unmarried garrison from an overseas province to strengthen the city. In fact, they were reinforced too the campaigns at that spot maintained until victory was secured; get-go firstly inward Sicily nether the direction of Claudius Marcellus, too after inward Hispania nether Scipio Africanus. Although the long-term consequences of Hannibal's state of war are debatable, this state of war was undeniably Rome's "finest hour".
Most of the sources available to historians close Hannibal are from Romans. They considered him the greatest enemy Rome had ever faced. Livy gives us the thought that he was extremely cruel. Even Cicero, when he talked of Rome too its 2 nifty enemies, spoke of the "honourable" Pyrrhus too the "cruel" Hannibal. Yet a dissimilar motion painting is sometimes revealed. When Hannibal's successes had brought close the decease of 2 Roman consuls, he vainly searched for the torso of Gaius Flaminius Nepos on the shores of Lake Trasimene, held ceremonial rituals inward recognition of Lucius Aemilius Paullus, too sent Marcellus' ashes dorsum to his theatre unit of measurement inward Rome. Any bias attributed to Polybius, however, is to a greater extent than troublesome, since he was clearly sympathetic towards Hannibal. Nevertheless, Polybius spent a long menstruum as a hostage inward Italy too relied heavily on Roman sources, so at that spot remains the possibility that he reproduced elements of Roman propaganda.
Legacy
Military history
Hannibal is unremarkably ranked amongst the best military machine strategists too tacticians. According to Appian, several years after the Second Punic War, Hannibal was a political advisor inward the Seleucid Kingdom too Scipio was sent at that spot on a embassy from Rome.
It is said that at i of their meetings inward the gymnasium Scipio too Hannibal had a conversation on the dependent area of generalship, inward the presence of a number of bystanders, too that Scipio asked Hannibal whom he considered the greatest general, to which the latter replied, "Alexander of Macedonia".
To this Scipio assented since he also yielded the firstly identify to Alexander. Then he asked Hannibal whom he placed next, too he replied, "Pyrrhus of Epirus", because he considered boldness the firstly qualification of a general; "for it would non live possible", he said, "to observe 2 kings to a greater extent than enterprising than these".
Scipio was rather nettled yesteryear this, but nevertheless he asked Hannibal to whom he would give the tertiary place, expecting that at to the lowest degree the tertiary would live assigned to him; but Hannibal replied, "to myself; for when I was a immature homo I conquered Hispania too crossed the Alps with an army, the firstly after Hercules.
As Scipio saw that he was probable to prolong his self-laudation he said, laughing, "where would y'all identify yourself, Hannibal, if y'all had non been defeated yesteryear me?" Hannibal, at nowadays perceiving his jealousy, replied, "in that illustration I should have got position myself before Alexander". Thus Hannibal continued his self-laudation, but flattered Scipio inward a indirect mode yesteryear suggesting that he had conquered i who was the superior of Alexander.
At the halt of this conversation Hannibal invited Scipio to live his guest, too Scipio replied that he would live so gladly if Hannibal were non living with Antiochus, who was held inward suspicion yesteryear the Romans. Thus did they, inward a mode worthy of nifty commanders, cast aside their enmity at the halt of their wars.
Hannibal's exploits (especially his victory at Cannae) proceed to live studied inward military machine academies all over the world.
Maximilian Otto Bismarck Caspari, inward his article inward the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica, praises Hannibal inward these words:
As to the transcendent military machine genius of Hannibal at that spot cannot live 2 opinions. The homo who for 15 years could handgrip his the world inward a hostile province against several powerful armies too a succession of able generals must have got been a commander too a tactician of supreme capacity. In the exercise of strategies too ambuscades he sure enough surpassed all other generals of antiquity. Wonderful as his achievements were, nosotros must marvel the to a greater extent than when nosotros select into concern human relationship the grudging back upwards he received from Carthage. As his veterans melted away, he had to organize fresh levies on the spot. We never hear of a mutiny inward his army, composed though it was of North Africans, Iberians too Gauls. Again, all nosotros know of him comes for the most part from hostile sources. The Romans feared too hated him so much that they could non do him justice. Livy speaks of his nifty qualities, but he adds that his vices were as great, amongst which he singles out his to a greater extent than than Punic perfidy too an inhuman cruelty. For the firstly at that spot would seem to live no farther justification than that he was consummately skillful inward the exercise of ambuscades. For the latter at that spot is, nosotros believe, no to a greater extent than the world than that at sure crises he acted inward the full general spirit of ancient warfare. Sometimes he contrasts most favorably with his enemy. No such brutality stains his call as that perpetrated yesteryear Claudius Nero on the vanquished Hasdrubal. Polybius exactly says that he was defendant of cruelty yesteryear the Romans too of avarice yesteryear the Carthaginians. He had indeed bitter enemies, too his life was i continuous struggle against destiny. For steadfastness of purpose, for organizing capacity too a mastery of military machine scientific discipline he has perchance never had an equal.
Even his Roman chroniclers acknowledged his supreme military machine leadership, writing that, "he never required others to do what he could too would non do himself". According to Polybius 23, 13, p. 423: "It is a remarkable too rattling cogent proof of Hannibal's having been yesteryear nature a existent leader too far superior to anyone else inward statesmanship, that though he spent seventeen years inward the field, passed through so many savage countries, too employed to assistance him inward desperate too extraordinary enterprises numbers of men of dissimilar nations too languages, no i ever dreamt of conspiring against him, nor was he ever deserted yesteryear those who had i time joined him or submitted to him."
Count Alfred von Schlieffen's eponymously titled "Schlieffen Plan" was developed from his military machine studies, with especially heavy emphasis on Hannibal's envelopment technique he employed to environment too victoriously destroy the Roman regular army at Cannae. George S. Patton believed that he was a reincarnation of Hannibal as good as many other people including a Roman legionary too a Napoleonic soldier. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of the Coalition Forces inward the Gulf War, claimed that "The technology scientific discipline of state of war may change, the sophistication of weapons sure enough changes. But those same principles of state of war that applied to the days of Hannibal apply today."
According to the military machine historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge, "Hannibal excelled as a tactician. No battle inward history is a finer sample of tactics than Cannae. But he was yet greater inward logistics too strategy. No captain ever marched to too fro amongst so many armies of troops superior to his ain numbers too fabric as fearlessly too skillfully as he. No homo ever held his ain so long or so ably against such odds. Constantly overmatched yesteryear ameliorate soldiers, led yesteryear generals ever respectable, oftentimes of nifty ability, he yet defied all their efforts to drive him from Italy, for one-half a generation. Excepting inward the illustration of Alexander, too some few isolated instances, all wars upwards to the Second Punic War, had been decided largely, if non entirely, yesteryear battle-tactics. Strategic powerfulness had been comprehended only on a small-scale scale. Armies had marched towards each other, had fought inward parallel order, too the conqueror had imposed terms on his opponent. Any variation from this dominion consisted inward ambuscades or other stratagems. That state of war could live waged yesteryear avoiding inward lieu of seeking battle; that the results of a victory could live earned yesteryear attacks upon the enemy’s communications, yesteryear flank-maneuvers, yesteryear seizing positions from which safely to threaten him inward illustration he moved, too yesteryear other devices of strategy, was non understood... [However] For the firstly fourth dimension inward the history of war, nosotros consider 2 contending generals avoiding each other, occupying impregnable camps on heights, marching close each other's flanks to seize cities or supplies inward their rear, harassing each other with small-war, too rarely venturing on a battle which mightiness evidence a fatal disaster—all with a well-conceived role of placing his opponent at a strategic disadvantage... That it did so was due to the pedagogy of Hannibal.
Hannibal inward literature
Hannibal's call is also commonplace inward after fine art too pop culture, an objective mensurate of his unusual influence on Western history.
Like other military machine leaders, Hannibal's victories against superior forces inward an ultimately losing cause won him enduring fame that outlasted his native province inside North Africa. His crossing of the Alps remains i of the most monumental military machine feats of ancient warfare too has since captured the imagination of the world (romanticized yesteryear several artworks).
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